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This paper examines trends in risk at the largest U.S.
commercial banks during the late 1980s. Prices of
exchange-tradedoptions on bankequityare usedto derive
several measuresofbanking risk. The results show that the
riskiness ofbankassets andactivities did increase atlarge
banks during the period. However, market capital-asset
ratios generally rose, leaving the burden on the deposit
insurance fund little changed. Hence, while the results
support the notion that banks now engage in a riskier
business than previously, the general increase in capital
has been sufficient to hold overall banking risk relatively
constant.
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A series of events during the 1980s generated renewed
concern about the condition oflarge commercial banking
firms in the United States. Losses on loans to.less-
developed countries, energy-related loans, and problems
relatedto real estate markets invarious regionsreducedthe
financial strength of many banks. At roughly the same
time, large banks expanded their activities in a variety
of nontraditional areas-including securities underwrit-
ing, trading of interest-rate and foreign-exchange-rate
instruments, and financing of highly leveraged transac-
tions-many ofwhich appeared to hold potential for, and
in some cases actually caused, significant losses. The
combination ofreductions in financial strength and expan-
sion into new activities raisedthe fear thatlargeU.S. banks
became significantly riskier during the 1980s.
Theriskinessofbanks mightbe oflessgeneralinterestif
not for its impactonfederal depositinsurance. The liability
borne by the insurance fund roughly depends on expected
losses due to bankfailures. Ifbanks became riskier during
the 1980s, losses may have become more likely, and the
liability of the insurance fund may have grown substan-
tially. Large banks are of particular concern, not only
because individually they are large components of the
banking system, but also because they, more so than
smaller banks, have been involved in the nontraditional
activities mentioned above. If risk has increased at large
banks, then some form ofregulatory response-forexam-
ple, increased bank capital standards, or restrictions on
bank activities-may be desirable. Alternatively, the ad-
verse conditions of the 1980s may not have affected risk
materially, in which case calls for an active regulatory
response to reduce risk are misdirected.
The well-publicized decline in the bank deposit insur-
ance fund, from 1.19 percent of insured deposits at the
beginning of1985 to 0.70 percent at the end of1989, may
seem to constitute clear evidence of an increase in risk.
However, Shaffer (1991) has demonstrated a fairly high
probability of problems of this magnitude, without any
change inthedistributionoflosses. Thatis, itis quite likely
that the FDIC could experience such losses purely through
a series of bad years, random "bad luck," without any
3change in bankingrisk. Thus, trends in bankingriskcannot
be examined simply by observing changes in the reserves
ofthe insurance fund over time.
This paperfocuses on the evolution ofrisk at nine ofthe
largestU.S. bank holding companies. Changes in several
measures ofbanking risk are examined. The primary con-
tribution ofthe paper is the use ofa new type ofdata: The
prices ofexchange-listed options on bank stocks. The size
of the deposit insurance liability at any point in time
depends critically on the prospects of insured banks.
Option prices provide a unique·source of information on
market beliefs regarding both future risk and current
financial condition, information that can be used to con-
struct estimates of the risk to the insurance fund.! In
addition, this paperprovides empirical implementation of
a relatively new model ofinsured banks, which is used to
link the option price data with stock price and financial
data to derive measures ofbanking risk.
The use of options data restricts the analysis to the
secondhalfofthe 1980s, when options on mostbankstocks
began trading. Although some of the events that reduced
the financial strength of banks-for example, losses on
energy loans and loans to less-developed countries-
occurred during the early 1980s, others, such as increased
involvement in securities underwriting and trading ofrela-
tively exotic financial instruments, also had effects in the
second halfofthe decade. A study by Furlong (1988) pro-
vides a useful complement to the present paper: Furlong
applied similarmethods to analyze changes in the first half
ofthe 1980s.
The first section ofthis paper defines three measures of
banking risk: The volatility ofreturns on bankasset portfo-
lios, the size ofbankcapital cushions as reflected in capital
ratios, and the overall liability imposed by banks on the
deposit insurance fund. Section II presents a contingent-
claim model of an insured bank and formalizes the three
measures of banking risk. Section III describes a method
for computing the market value and volatility of bank
assets for use in the contingent-claim model; the section
also discusses in detail the reasonable range of values for
some key unobservable parameters of the model. Section
IV explains the methodology and data used to infer esti-
mates ofrisk from the market prices ofbank stock options
and presents the resulting estimates. Section V contains
the major results ofthe paper regarding changes in risk at
large banks in the late 1980s. The last section ofthe paper
provides some concluding remarks.
I. Risk in Banking
From an ultimate policy perspective, probably the most depositors from losses due to unanticipated declines in the
important banking-related risk is the risk oflosses to the value ofassets.) Capitalization is expressed most conven-
deposit insurance fund. The expected value ofthese losses iently in terms of the capital ratio (the ratio of capital to
at any particular bank depends (1) on the probability that total assets), with a higher capital ratio implying lower
the bank's assets will fall short of its liabilities, thereby financial risk, all else equal.
exhausting the bank's own capital, and (2) on the sizeofthe The second broad type of risk is operating risk, which
shortfall iflosses shouldoccur. Ofcourse, payouts fromthe depends on the riskiness ofthe bank's asset portfolio. This
insurance fund also depend on the degree ofcoverage of- risk is measured most directly by the variability ofthe rate
fered by the insurer. But under any given coverage policy, ofreturn on bank assets, referred to as the "volatility" of
the probability that a bank will fail and the size of the the bank's asset portfolio. Volatility is quantified by the
necessary insurance payment in the event of failure com- statistical standard deviation ofpercentage changes in the
bine to determine the present value of the liability of the value ofbank assets. A bank with higher asset volatility is
fund. more likely to fail (and, ifitfails, is more likely to impose a
Both factors in tum reflect two broad types of banking larger burden on the insurance fund) for any given capital
risk. The first is financial risk, which depends on bank ratio.
capital: The probability that a bank will fail varies in- Calculating capital ratios and asset volatilities in order
versely with the bank's capitalization for a given combina- to measure risk is not a simple task. The relevant capital
tion ofbank assets and activities. Capital is defined in this ratios must be computed from the market values ofassets
paper as the difference between assets and liabilities, ex- and liabilities, but market values often are not observable.
clusive of deposit insurance. (Equity and capital are not Similarly, the relevant volatilities are the volatilities ofthe
identical in this context; the value of equity includes the actual economic returns on the market value of assets;
value of the protection afforded by federal deposit insur- these returns may be very different from the observable
ance, which limits the liabilityofstockholders and protects accounting returns on the book value assets. Hence, to
4 Economic Review / Fall 1991measure either financial risk or operating risk, or to
combine the two into an estimate of the insurance fund
liability, market values somehow must be calculated.
Although the market value ofbank assets is not observ-
able, the market value ofbank equity is observable, since
large banks have shares traded on stock exchanges. Ifthe
stock market is efficient, then the market value ofequity
reflects the market value of assets (although it also may
depend on other factors, including the value of deposit
insurance); hence, a model that correctly specifies the
relationship betweenequity and assetvalues canbeused to
inferthe latterfrom theformer. In addition, the volatility of
equityreflects the unobservable volatilityofthe underlying
assets, again suggesting the possibility of inferring one
from the other. The next section describes a model that, in
addition to filtering out the effects ofdeposit insurance on
equity values, relates the market value and volatility of
bank equity to the market value and volatility of bank
assets to permit inferences from observed market data.
n. Model ofan Insured Bank
where c is not necessarily equal to zero, and the capital
ratio k is defined as
at date T. However, in reality regulators have some discre-
tionregardingclosure, and the regulatory closurethreshold
need not be the point of actual insolvency. Banks may be
closed while net worth is positive, or may be allowed to
continue operating with negative net worth. Ifthe regula-
tory rule is that a bank is closed if its capital ratio is less
than c, then the value ofequity at the monitoring date T is
AT-BT (3) kT == .
AT
(A minor difference between this model and (I) is that the
closurerule is statedinterms ofthe capitalratioratherthan
in terms ofthe relationship between assets and liabilities.
Note that if c=O, then k>c implies A>B.) Banks that
remain open at date T experience a lump-sum increase in
value from the rents conferred by a banking charter, where
<1>BTis the value ofthose rents.4
Realistically, ET cannever benegative, since the owners
ofa bankcan always exercise theirrightoflimitedliability
to walk away from a losing proposition. Thus it must be
true that banks are closed at capital ratios above the level at
which the charter value would be completely offset by
negativenetworth; thatis, at the pointk= c, itmustalso be
true that A - B - <1>B?;;O. Rewriting this restriction based
on the definition ofthe capital ratio, the closure threshold
must satisfy c?;; - <1>1(1- <1». Ifthe closure threshold were
set lower, regulators would be forced to inject funds-an
outright gift, not just a loan-to induce some low-capital
banks (those with c<k< - <1>/(1- <1») not to close volun-
tarily. The injection would have to be large enoughto bring
assets, andhence the capitalratio, backup to the minimum
(2)
At any time priorto T, the total market value ofa bank's
equity is equal to the discounted value of this payoff
structure. Equity in the model is a contingent claim (a
positive payoffto equity is contingent upon the bank being
solvent at T), and its value at any earlier point in time can
be calculated using the same valuation techniques used in
pricing other contingent claims, such as options.
Levonian (1991) revised this contingent-claim model of
insured banks to incorporate both a flexible regulatory
closure threshold and positive bank charter value. 2 The
inclusion of charter value recognizes the fact that, in
practice, banks operate under special charters granted by
either state or federal authorities; because the supply of
bank charters is limited, the positive value conferred by a
charter is not competed away. Charter value is modeled as
being a fraction <1> of liabilities, and as being received by
bank equity holders at date T only ifthe bank is not closed
by regulators. 3
In Merton (1977), banks are closed ifthey are insolvent
Merton (1974) applied contingent-claim techniques to
the general problem of valuing the debt and equity of
levered firms; inMerton (1977), the same techniques were
applied specifically to insured banks. Following Merton's
initial theoretical work, Marcus and Shaked (1984) imple-
mented a similar model to derive empirical estimates of
bank capital, asset volatility, and the size of the deposit
insurance liability. In these models, banks have market
value of assets At (excluding the value of deposit insur-
ance), and total liabilities maturing with face value BT at
date T, at which time the bank is examined by regulators
and is closed if assets do not equal or exceed liabilities.
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(9)
level of - <1>/(1- <1». While the FDIC does sometimes
provide so-called openbankassistance, the actual extentof
any wealth transfer is not obvious, since the emergency
funding generally must be repaid by the surviving institu-
tion, Insuchcases, any netinjectionofcapitalcomes inthe
form of FDIC acceptance of a below-market rate on the
funds. As an alternative and less complex treatmentofthis
possibility, any assistance anticipated by the market is
assumed to be capitalized into <1>, and c is always no less
than - <1>/(1- <1».
As in most applications of contingent-claim methods,
assets are assumed to follow a stochastic process given by
(4)
where !-LA is the expected instantaneous periodic rate of
return on assets, t is a time index, dz is the differential ofa
Wiener process, and aA is the instantaneous standard
deviation ofthe rate ofreturn on assets, or asset volatility.
Let the date t = 0 represent the present, and let unsub-
scripted variables denote present values. Using standard
methods for valuing contingent claims (see Smith 1976),








and N(e)is the cumulative standard normal distribution
function. Equity is essentially a call option on assets, plus
an additional lump sumequal to the expectedpresentvalue
of the charter. 5 The first two terms in (5) represent the
familiar option value; the thirdtermis the chartervalue <l>B
weighted by a factor that is closely related to the proba-
bility that the bank will remain open.6
Measures of Banking Risk
Given this theoretical framework, the central issue of
this paper can be posed more explicitly. In particular,
financial risk has increased at large banks if the market
6
value capital ratio kdefined in (3) has decreased; operating
risk has increased at large banksifthe volatility of assets
a A has increased.
The deposit insurance liability, which combines the
effects ofboth types ofrisk, also can be calculated explic-
itly once values for A and a A have been obtained. The
deposit insurance contract is another contingent claim and
canbe evaluated using the same methods. All ofthe banks
in the sample are sufficiently large thatthe markethas good
reason to expect that all creditors will be protected from
losses in the event of a failure; hence, the contingent
deposit insurance liability should be modeled under the
assurnption that the claimcovered by the insureris B, even
though not all liabilities are formally insured. The typical
method of resolution when such a large bank fails is to
locate a purchaser for the failed institution; the acquirer
receives the assets and the charter of the failed bank and
assumes all ofthe liabilities. Ifthe liabilities assumed by
the acquirer exceed the value ofthe assets and charter, the
deposit insurer makes up the difference. Thus, the insur-
ance fund pays the acquirer B - (<I>B +A)= (1 - <I»B - A if
that difference is positive, and otherwise pays nothing.




o if BT"'SAT+ <l>BT
Again using standard contingent-claim valuation tech-
niques, the value of the contingent payout in (7) is
(8) V = (1- <I>)BN(y+aAVT) - Ae -yTN(y),
where
(
(1 - <I>)B\ a~T
In A -"IT) - -2-
y == e
aAVT
The dividend rate, "Y, appears in (8) and (9) because divi-
dend payments directly reduce the assets available to the
deposit insurer in the event of failure. (Note that "Y is the
rate of dividend payments relative to assets, not equity.)
The overall risk to the deposit insurance fund posed by
large banks has increased if V has increased.
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(12)
(10)
Assuming that the value ofbankequity is determined as
in(5) itis possible to \\lork backwardfrom the stock market
prices of large publicly traded banks to infer the market
value ofassets and asset volatility. Various realistic values
can be assumed for bank liabilities B, the regulatory
monitoring interval T, the capital ratio closure threshold e,
andthe chartervalue ratio <1>. The two remaining unknowns
in (5) are the value ofassets (JA and the volatility ofassets
(JA'
Obviously, a single equation cannot be solved for two
unknowns; a second independent equation is needed.
Merton (1974) suggests applying Ito's Lemma to the
expression for the value of equity, to yield a second
equation relating the volatility ofequity and the volatility
of assets. Merton derives the relationship7
aE A
(JE = (JA aA E
An intuitive graspof(10) follows from consideringthe case
in which bank stockholders do not have limited liability for
the debts of the bank. In that case, the contingent aspect
that makes equity behave like a call option on assets
disappears, and the value of equity changes one-for-one
with the value ofassets. 8 Then aElaA = 1, and (10) reduces
to (JE = (JA(AIE), with the straightforward interpretation
that the volatility of equity is simply the "levered-up"
volatility of the underlying assets. However, with limited
corporateliability, equity becomes somewhatless sensitive
to changes in asset values, as gains and losses are shared
partially with debtholders. Then aEliJA<I, and (JE falls
relative to (JA-
In the present case, differentiation of (5) yields
aE OBN'(x-(JAVT)
(11) aA = N(x) + , c;;- ,
A(JA vT
where N'(.) is the standard normal density function and
0=1/(1-c) - (1- <1». Using (11), the expression in (10)




Equation (12) depends on all of the same variables as
equation (5). If (JE is observable, then under identical
assumptions regarding the parameters of the model, this
equation also has A and (JA as the only unknowns, and (5)
and (12) can be solved simultaneously for values ofthe two
unknown variables. 9
As noted above, solving these two equations to obtain
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market assets and volatility requires making assumptions
aboutthe other parameters: bank liabilities B, the regula-
tory monitoring interval T, the capitalratio closure thresh-
olde, and the charter value ratio <1>. The market value of
bankliabilities is assumed to be approximately equal to
bookvalue, since the bulkofbankliabilities are shortterm.
The monitoring interval is assumed to be one year; this
corresponds roughly to bank examination frequency. As-
sumptions regarding the charter value and closure thresh-
old assumptions require more detailed explanation.
The Charter Value Ratio
Previous approaches to estimating bank charter value
are inappropriate for this analysis. For example, Keeley
(1990) divides the sum ofbookvalue liabilities and market
value equitybybookvalue ofassets, anduses this ratio as a
proxy for Tobin's q to examine changes in charter value;
Kwan (1991) applies a similar approach based on q. Such
estimates based on the market value ofbankequity cannot
capture the concept of charter value as defined in this
paper, because they do not separate the effect of deposit
insurance from other components of measured charter
value. Some other method must be used to define a
reasonable value for <1>.
In practice, the value of a bank charter is likely to
manifest itself in nonmarket interest rate spreads: either a
rate ofreturn on bank loans in excess of the required rate
for that level ofrisk, or a below-market rate ofinterest on
deposits, or some combination ofthe two. Hence, informa-
tion on deposit and loan spreads can be used to develop an
estimate of <1>.
On the deposit side, if the bank charter gives the bank
the ability to set rd<rf and still attract federally insured
deposits, the basic contingent claim model ofbank equity
must be modified; without the lump-sum charter value,
equation (5) becomes
(5') E = AN(x') - Be(rd - rf)N(x' - (J),
where T = 1without loss of generality and
(6') x' = In(AIB)+(r f - rd+(J2/2) .
(J
This can be viewed as an alternative formulation ofthe
basic model presented in (5), in which the charter value
is received as a flow over time in the form of a rate
spread rather than as a lump sum <1>B at the end of
the period. Comparing the two forms of the model, if
the relatively small effect of (rd - rf ) on x' is ignored,
7where
Thus, in the context of the model presented above in (5),
the effect on bank equity is roughly equivalent to setting
(1- <p) = - Ll/(1-k).
If a chartered bank has positive spreads on both the
deposit and the loan side of the business, the joint effect
can be approximated as
loan spread was proxied by the difference between the
weighted average interest rate on short-term commercial
and industrial bank loans (from the Federal Reserve's
survey oftermsofbanklending) andthe rateon one-month
cOlnmercial paper. (One-month commercial paper was
used b~causeit was closest to the average maturity ofbank
loans reported in the terms-of-Iending survey.) Combining
the average values of the interest rate spreads (based on
quarterly data for the sample period) with values of k
between 0 and 10 percent produced estimates ofthe value
of<p in the relatively narrow range of0.016 to0.018. Since
substantial approximation error is likely, these estimates
should be taken only as indicative ofthe neighborhood of
the charter value ratio; values for <I> of 0.01 and 0.02 are
used in Section V to bracket a reasonable range.
In the model, the charter value ratio is assumed to be
constant over time. In reality, interest rate spreads fluctu-
ate, and a systematic trend might cause calculations based
onthe assumptionofconstant <p to bebiased. To testforthe
existence of a trend, the sum of the interest rate spreads
was regressed on a time variable, with a correction for first
order autocorrelation. The trend coefficient was positive
but insignificant (at the 5 percent level) during the sample
period. Thus, the assumption that <I> is constant over time
probably is innocuous.
The chartervalue ratio also is assumedto be identicalfor
all banks in the sample. It is possible that differences
in managerial ability, location, and other factors might
cause different banks to reap different benefits from their
charters. However, the nine banks in this sample are suf-
ficiently similar in size and character that interbank dif-
ferences in <p are unlikely to be major, despite some
variation in business strategy among the sample firms.
The Closure Threshold
Itis unlikely that regulators would seize any ofthe large
banks in the sample at positive market value capital ratios.
Hence, the assumed value ofc almost certainly should be
zero or less. However, as noted in Section II, a credible
closure point cannot be so low that the charter value is
completely exhausted before the bank is closed; that is the
threshold must satisfy c;:?; - <1>/(1- <1». Since the charter
value ratio is assumedto be in the range of0.01 to 0.02, the
closure threshold cannot be less than about 0.01 if <I> is on
the low side at 0.01, or 0.02 if <I> is 0.02.
As with the charter value ratio, there is some possibility
thatc varies eitherovertime, oracross banksin the sample,
orboth. Substantial interbank variation within this sample
seems unlikely, for the same reasons given above in the









The approximation in (15) was combined with data on
interest rates to provide a sense ofreasonable values for <p.
The deposit rate spread was proxied by the difference
between the rate on six-month certificates ofdeposit (the
national average from BankRateMonitor) and the second-
ary market yield on six-month U.S. Treasury bills. The
then (1 - <p) = e(rd - rf). In this case, the charter value ratio
can be approximated by the deposit interest rate spread,
<p=rf - rd, since for realistic spreads it will be true that
e(rd-rf)=I-(r f - rd)'
Ifinstead the charter allows the bank to earn an above-
market rate ofreturn on assets, a variant ofthe contingent
claim model is appropriate. McDonald and Siegel (1984)
considerthe case ofa contingentclaim on an asset earning
a rate ofreturn different from the appropriate risk-adjusted
rate. If A is the loan spread-the rate of return on loans
held by the bankminus the requiredrate ofreturnfor assets
ofcomparable risk-then the value ofbank equity can be
expressed as
(5") E = Aet..N(x") - BN(x" - cr),
where again T = 1and
This version ofthe model, with A multiplied by a factor
et.. which is positively relatedto chartervalue, suggests that
the charter value should be modeled as being proportion-
al to assets rather than liabilities in this case. How-
ever, recognizing that A =BI(1-k), that for most banks
N(x")=N(x" - cr), and that et..=1+A for realistic values
ofLl, and ignoring the trivial effectofAonx': a value ofLl
greater than zero increases the value ofbank equity by an
amount equal to
8 Economic Review I Fall 1991policy changed during the period, there should be some
evidence ofa change in the loss experience ofthe deposit
insurance fund. To examine this possibility, FDIC losses
resulting from bank closures (deposit payoffs, deposit
transfers, and purchase and assistance transactions) were
computed fromthe FDIC's AnnualReport and divided by
the deposits ofclosed banks to construct a loss ratio. This
ratio was roughly the same at the end ofthe sample period
as at the beginning, and a regression ofthe ratio on a time
variable revealed no significant trend during the 1980s.
Thus, the assumption of constant c probably is a reason-
able approximation. lO
IV. Equity Volatility From 'fraded Option Prices
The two-equation approach to deriving estimates of A
and <TA for a sample ofbanks has been used previously by
Marcus and Shaked (1984), Ronn and Verma (1986),
Furlong (1988), and Kendall and Levonian (1991), among
others. All of these earlier studies used the standard
deviation ofhistorically observed stock returns for equity
volatility <TE' Butconceptually, the relevant volatility is the
expected volatility over the period from t= 0 to t= T. Use
of historical volatility assumes that expectations at each
point in time are formed adaptively, and therefore reflect
realizations over some recent interval. Iftraders form their
expectations of <TE using information in addition to histor-
ical returns, then the historical standard deviation may be
a poor proxy for the expected volatility required in the
contingent-claim framework.
A more·direct measure of expected volatility is both
desirable and available. Options on bank stocks trade on
several U.S. options exchanges; the prices ofstock options
are known to depend in part on the expected volatility of
the underlying stocks. Using an option pricing model,
values of expected <TE can be inferred from traded option
prices.ll Because exchange-traded stock options in the
UnitedStateshave American terms (meaningthatthe hold-
er may choose to exercise prior to expiration), expected
volatilities are inferred from an American option pricing




where C is the value of a T-period American call option
with exercise price X on a stock with price Sand continu-
ous dividend rate '& (dividends relative to equity), r is the
risk~free interest rate, and z is defined as
In(~) + T(r-'&)+ T<T~
(17) z == X 2
<TEVT
The first two terms in (16) give the value of a European
option, which cannot be exercised prior to the expiration
date. The function peS, X, T, <TE. r, '&) is an approximation
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of the early exercise premium (the difference in value
between an American option and a European option due to
thepossibility ofearly exercise), the exactform ofwhich is
derived by Barone-Adesi and Whaley. They demonstrate
that their approximation works well for the range of
expirations used in this paper.
All ofthe variables in(16) are observableinthe financial
pressorelsewhere, withthe exceptionof <TE' Although (16)
cannot be inverted for (J"E> standard numerical techniques
can be used to find the unique value of <TE satisfying (16),
whichis referredto as the "impliedvolatility" ofthe stock.
This implied volatility can then be used in (12) to solve for
<TA andA.
Levonian (1988) showedthatimpliedvolatilities ofbank
stocks differ substantially from volatilities calculated us-
inghistorical stockreturns. BothBlackand Scholes (1972)
and Latane and Rendleman (1976) used tests based on
observed option prices to show that historical volatility is
inferior to implied volatility as a predictor of future vol-
atility; Schmalensee and Trippi (1978) obtained similar
results. Hence, volatilities implied by option prices should
provide better information about the riskiness of bank
stocks, and consequently about the various types ofbank-
ingrisk, thanwould volatility estimates basedonhistorical
stock returns.
However, the use of implied volatility is not without
cost. Since far fewer banks have traded options than have
traded stock, the sample size is reduced substantially. As
always in empirical research, small sample size may bias
the results. Thus, it is possible that the results may fail to
represent adequately the riskiness ofthe banking industry
as a whole, even though the volatility estimates for each
individual bank are likely to be superior.
Options Sample
The sample for this paper consists oflisted call options
from the various options exchanges in the United States,
sampledatthe endsofthe second andfourth quarters ofthe
five years 1985 through 1989, for nine large banking firms:
BankAmerica, Bankers Trust, Chase Manhattan, Chemi-
cal, Citicorp, First Chicago, J.P.Morgan, Manufacturers
9Hanover, and Security Pacific. This group comprised nine
ofthe top ten U.S. banks at the beginning of1985, ranked
by assets. (The tenth, First Interstate, also has exchange-
listed options, but trading was too infrequent to allow
constructionofareliable time series.) These are options on
the common stocks ofbank holding companies, not banks;
however, to the extent that the predominant assets of
holding companies are banking-related, the implied vol-
atilities provide information on bank asset risk. The term
"bank" is used to refertothese firms throughout the paper.
The interest rates used in the option pricing model were
the yields-to-maturity on the U.S. Treasury bills maturing
closest to the expiration date ofeach option. The dividend
rates were computed by assuming that expected dividends
during the life of each option were identical to dividends
actually paid·and then calculating equivalent continuous
rates. 12Last-trade~of-the-weekcalloption prices and stock
prices for the nine banks were collected from published
listings in The Wall Street Journal.
Day and Lewis (1988) describe two sources ofpotential
bias in the use ofpublished prices. One is the problem of
nonsynchronous trading, that the last option trade for any
given bankmay nothave occurredat the lastobservedstock
price; the option valuation model in (16) requires the use of
acontemporaneous stockprice. The otheris that stocks and
options trade with a spread between the bid price and the
askprice, and reported trades may occurateitherthe bidor
the ask or at prices in between, making it impossible to
observe a precise estimate ofvalue. Day and Lewis argue
that estimates of implied volatility should incorporate
information from the prices ofseveral different options on
the same stock in order to minimize the potential bias.
Studies ofoption volatility have used a variety ofmethods
for combining different options on a single underlying
security (for example, compare Day and Lewis to Latane
and Rendleman or Schmalensee and Trippi.
To deal with these problems, for each bank only the two
options with exercise prices closest to the current stock
price are used. That is, for all ofthe options with exercise
prices above the current stock price, the option with the
lowest exercise price is selected; in addition, for all ofthe
options with exercise prices below the stockprice, only the
one with the highest exercise price is selected, for each
bank. Day and Lewis show that trading volume is concen-
trated in these "near-the-money" options; for the index
options they examine, about 70 to 90 percentofthe volume
is in options with exercise prices justabove and justbelow
the current stock price. Even a cursory review ofpublished
options sales data confirms that this relationship is true in
general. As Day and Lewis point out, any lack ofsynchro-
nization between the closing stock price and the closing
10
optionprice will be minimizedfor these options. They also
note that the percentage bid-ask spread is less for these
options, reducing the second source of· bias as well.
(Feinstein 1988 provides a discussion of other desirable
properties of near-the-money options for the purpose of
inferring volatilities from prices.)
It is possible that at any point in time market traders
anticipate that volatility will change in some predictable
way over time. In that case, the options from which the
stockvolatility isinferred shouldhave expirations identical
to the regulatory monitoring interval for banks, assumed to
be one year in this paper. However, until very recently
exchange~traded stock options were restricted to expira~
tions ofless than a year; moreover, the most active trading
generally occurs in options with short expirations. Thus,
short-term options are likely to yield superiorestimates of
expectedcrE' and these estimates can be used in the bank
equity model provided that volatility is not expected to
change drastically between the expiration date of the
option and the end of the regulatory monitoring period.
However, using the shortest expirations may introduce
other problems; Day and Lewis document a statistically
significant increase in implied volatility for options as the
expiration date approaches, especially in the last few
trading days. They attribute this effect to technical factors
related to the unwinding ofhedged positions. To achieve a
balance between both types of distortions, the options
sample for this study consists ofthe shortest-term options
for each bank, but with a minimum time to expiration of
one month. This sample selection process is similar in
spirit to that used by Schmalensee and Trippi (1978).
An additional complicating factor is that unusual events
or changes in option market liquidity might cause option
prices from a single week to be unrepresentativeofthe true
riskiness ofbanks. To minimize this problem, prices were
sampled for three consecutive weeks surrounding each
semiannual sample point: The weekofthe financial report-
ing date, one week before that date, and one week after. For
each bank in each of the weeks, prices of the two call
options withexerciseprices nearestto the underlying stock
price and with shortest time to expiration (but exceeding
one month) were collected. Implied stock volatility was
calculated for each option, and all six options averaged for
each bank at each semiannual date. The procedure pro-
duced 90 estimates of volatility (ten semiannual observa-
tions for nine banks).!3
Stock Volatility Estimates
A weighted average ofthe nine banks was computed for
each time period to summarize the resulting implied stock
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Chart 1
Stock Return Volatility
Portfolio of 9 BHes
Friday October 13 and Monday October 16. OnFriday, the
failure of VAL Corp. to obtain financing for a leveraged
buyout precipitated a large decline in the overall stock
market. Stocks of large banks were hit especially hard,
apparently because the news was taken as a signal of a
fundamental change in a major line ofbusiness. (Citicorp
had the largest percentage single-day drop at 16 percent,
and J.P. Morgan had the smallest at 5.5 percent.) On
Monday, stockprices increased, recovering aportionofthe
value lost on the preceding Friday. A 60-day historical
volatility calculation treats returns from these days equally
with the other 58 days in the period. In reality, it is likely
that traders viewed these two days as extreme events, and
thatby the endofDecembertraders gave them little weight
in formulating expectations ofbank stock volatilities. The
lower implied volatilities from option markets for 89:IV
are direct reflections ofexpectations at that date, automat-













volatilities and to presentthe patternofchanges during the
late 1980s. The weights for the observations were the
marketvalue ofeach bank's equity (stock price multiplied
by number ofshares) divided by the total market value of
equity ofall nine banks for that date. The resulting weight-
edaverage canbeviewed as an index ofimpliedbankstock
volatility, with heavier emphasis given to banks that are
largercomponents oftotal bankstock marketvalue. (Alter-
natively, if returns on bank stocks were perfectly corre-
lated, this average would equal the volatility of a stock
portfolio consisting of equal percentages of each bank's
equity, for example 5 percentofBank A, 5 percentofBank
B, etc.)The results are presentedinChart 1, withvolatility
stated in annual terms (that is, the figures can be inter-
pretedas standarddeviations ofannualpercentagechanges
inthepricesofthe stocks). Asimilarlyconstructedindexof
historical volatility is presentedfor comparison. Historical
volatility was computed as the annualized standard devia-
tion ofstock returns for the 60 trading days (roughly three
months) preceding the end ofthe quarter.
One notable feature of Chart 1 is the upward spike in
both implied and historical volatility in the fourth quarter
of 1987. Implied volatility rose from 22 percent to 36
percent, and historical from 26 percentto 40 percent. This
spike corresponds to the period immediately following the
stock market crash of October 1987. Over the following
year, volatility returned to levels similarto those preceding
the crash. This pattern was not unique to bank stocks:
Schwert (1990) documents similar effects for implied and
historical volatility for the overall stock market as meas-
ured by the S&P500 stock index.
While the patterns of historical and implied volatility
around the time of the crash are similar, there are notice-
able differences in the rest ofthe sample period. Historical
is almost always higher than implied for this sample, and
three ofthe nine quarter-to-quarterchanges are opposite in
sign. The fourth quarterof1989, in which the divergence is
especially pronounced, provides an excellent example of
the primary drawback of historical volatility. The high
standarddeviation ofrealized returns for the fourth quarter
of 1989 is due to stock price movements on two dates,
V. Changes in Banking Risk, 1985-1989
The stock volatility results hold some intrinsic interest,
and are roughly comparable to the bank stock volatility
results presented by Jonathan Neuberger in another article
inthisReview. (Neubergerexamineschanges in bankstock
riskduring the 1980s in greaterdetail, and investigates the
relationship between bank stock returns and returns in the
bond market and the overall stock market.) However, the
main purpose of the preceding stock volatility computa-
tions is to provide the raw material for other calculations
related to banking risk. In this section, estimates of the
threemeasures ofbanking riskare presentedfor the second
halfofthe 1980s. Asset volatilities are obtained from the
simultaneous solution ofequations (5) and (12), using the
implied (J'E for eachbankin eachperiodas the inputto (12).
Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco 11The solutions for market asset values from (5) and (12) are
used to compute market value capital ratios from equation
(3). Finally, the liability ofthe insurance fund is calculated
from (8), also using the two-equation solution values of <TA
andA.
As discussed in Section III, the market value of bank
liabilities is assumed to be equal to book value, and the
monitoring interval is set equal to one year. The actual
dividends paid by each bank during each year are used to
compute the dividend rate 'Y in (8), under an assumption
that dividends were paid as expected. The earlier discus-
sion of realistic ranges for the charter value ratio and the
closure threshold concluded that <1>=0.01 and <1>=0.02
would provide a reasonable bracket for charter value, and
that c should be less than or equal to zero, but no larger in
absolute value than <1>. Thus, four cases are considered for
combinations ofthese two parameters:
Cl: c = 0.00, <I> = 0.01 Charters have low value, and
banks are closed when they are
insolvent in market value, that
is, when A<B.
C2: c = 0.01, <I> = 0.01 Charters have low value, and
banks are closed when charter
value is exhausted.
C3: c = 0.01, <I> = 0.02 Charters have high value, and
banks are closed before charter
value is exhausted.
C4: c = 0.02, <I> = 0.02 Charters have high value, and
banks are closed when charter
value is exhausted.
Comparing the results from the four cases provides insight
into the sensitivity to changes in the assumptions. Three
pairwise comparisons are most interesting:
Cl vs. C2: impact of a lower closure threshold when
charter value is low.
C3 vs. C4: impact of a lower closure threshold when
charter value is high.
C2 vs. C3: impact ofhigher charter value with a fixed
closure threshold.
Operating Risk
Weighted averages are constructed to summarize the
individual bank results for each time period, with each
bank weighted by liabilities relative to total liabilities of
the nine banks for that date. The individual banks could
instead have been weighted by equity (as with the stock
volatilities above) orby assets. Otherweightings produced
very similar results.
Chart 2 shows the evolution of bank operating risk as
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case C4 is presented, because alternative assumptions
about c and <I> had very little effect on the estimates of <TA .
The general upward trend shows that operating risk did
indeed increase at large banks during the late 1980s: The
level of asset volatility in 89:IV was about 80 percent
higherthanin85:II. Atleastinpart, this increasemay have
been due to the expanded range ofactivities conducted by
banks. The rate of increase in operating risk is consistent
with that found by Furlong (1988) for the early 1980s,
implying that bank assets became progressively more
volatile across the entire decade. Interestingly, the increase
in average asset volatility in the fourth quarterof1987 was
not dramatically different from adjacent periods. Hence,
the significant jump in stock volatility in that period was
notdue to any greatincrease in the riskiness ofbankassets
as perceived by the market.
The pattern ofasset volatility during the period is most
heavily influenced by the larger banks in the sample, such
as Citicorp, because ofthe use ofa weighted average. The
patterns for individual banksdiffersomewhat, althoughfor
eachofthe nine banks asset volatility was higherat the end
ofthe sample period than at the beginning.
Financial Risk
Chart 3 shows weighted-average market capital ratio
results for two illustrative cases, C2 and C3. Capital ratios
were higher at the end of the sample period than at the
beginning, implying that financial risk decreased at large
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banks. (The pattern also is representative of the banks
individually, exceptthat several banks show slightdeclines
in capital ratios in the fourth quarter of 1989.) However,
marketcapital ratios suffered a tremendous hitin the stock
market crash, from which they only gradually recovered
over the next one-and-a-half to two years.
Inthetw() casesomittedfrom Chart3,Clwas essentially
thesameasC2, andC4was littledifferentfromC3, demon~
strating that variations in the assumed closure threshold
have a trivial impact on the resulting capital ratio esti-
mates. The only major distinction among the four alterna-
tive sets ofassumptions was that variations in the assumed
charter value produced capital ratios that differed by
roughly the magnitudeofthedifferenceinthechartervalue
ratio. The reason is straightforward. Recall that the capital
ratio k is based on assets exclusive of the charter value;
since a highercharter value should make bank stock more
valuable all else equal, a given market value ofequity can
only beconsistentwith a lower marketvalue of ass~ts,and
hence a lower market value ofbankcapital. Exceptforthis
charter value difference, the pattern over time is very
similar in all four cases.
The decline in the market capitalization ofbanks result-
ingfrom theOctober1987 crashevidentinChart3explains
the pattern ofimplied stock volatility observed in Chart1.
Although Chart 2 showed that the riskiness ofbank assets
did.not increase, the market value of equity fell as st()ck
prices collapsed, and large banks suddenly becatIl~ nmch
mOre highly levered. The higher volatility of bank stock
Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco
returns reflected in call option prices stemmed from
traders' recognition that any given percentage change in
the returnonbankassets wouldtranslate into amuchlarger
percentage change in return on the stock, when viewed
relative to the lower base value of equity. (In terms of
equation (10), the ratio AlE increased; for a given (TA> this
leverage increase caused (TE to rise.) An interesting im-
plication of the results presented here is that, at least for
banks, the increase in volatility was ofroughly the magni-
tude that should be expected after a decline in market
equity-to-asset ratios of the extent experienced in the
October crash.
The Deposit Insurance Liability
Chart 4 shows the path of the estimated deposit insur-
ance liability over the sample period. Because the over-
whelming impactofthe stockmarketcrash makes ithardto
see the pattern ofchanges in the deposit insurance liability
for otherperiods, PanelBdisplays the sameresults as Panel
A, but with the 87:IV data omitted.
Panel A displays the total value of the liability at each
date, summed across banks, for each ofthe four parameter
cases. The stock market crashhad a temporary butdramat-
ic impact on the computed liability ofthe insurance fund.
In case Cl, for example, the liability rises from $2.4
millionin 87:IIto$45.3 million in 87:IV, thenfalls backto
nearthe year-earlierlevelby 88:II. The reasonis clearfTom
Chart 3: The fall in market capital ratios associated with
the decline in bank stock prices caused a large increase in
financial risk at these banks, and the ensuing recovery in
market value reversed the change. Each bank in the sample
exhibits roughly the same pattern.
In all four cases in Panel B, the liability is only slightly
higher at the end of the sample period than at the begin-
ning. This conclusion would holdeven ifthe correct values
of c and <p changed during the period. For example, if
regulators began allowing more poorly capitalized banks
to remain open as time passed, so that C3 was most
realistic at first and C4 was most realistic at the end, the
89:IV liability incase C4is stilllittle greater than the 85:II
liability in case C3.
However, it is also true that the deposit insurance lia-
bility increased substantially during the middle partofthe
sample period, and that the increase predated the stock
marketcrash. The change in risk was driven by the general
increase in financial risk that began in 86:II, during a
period of rising operating risk. The increase in market
capital ratios toward the endofthe sample period (assisted
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Panel B: Without 1987:IV
C2








brought the deposit insurance liability down to near its
earlier level. 14
Comparison of the various cases reveals that assump-
tions aboutthe closure threshold and the chartervalue ratio
have some impact on the computed deposit insurance
liability ateachpoint in time, although not a majorimpact.
Comparing Cl to C2 and C3 to C4 shows that an earlier
closure assumption reduces the total liability. The magni-
tude ofthe effect is roughly the same under either charter
value assumption. (Note that this result does not demon-
strate that instituting a policy of earlier closure would
reduce risk to the deposit insurance fund. These derived
results are conditional on the observed prices of bank
stocks; an explicit policy change probably would generate
a behavioral response by banks, and would alterthe market
value ofbank equity, thus complicating any evaluation ofa
change in regulatory policy. This point is similar to the
"Lucas critique" in macroeconomics.)
Comparing C2 to C3, different assumptions about the
value of bank charters have a somewhat larger impact on
the computed liability, for a given closure threshold as-
sumption: The higher value of <l> implies a smallerdeposit
insurance liability. This effect stems from the assumption
that the deposit insurer uses the charters offailed banks to
offset at least partially any required transfer from the
insurance fund. It is interesting also to compare C2 to C4
in this regard. In both cases, the closure threshold is set so
that the bank is closed as late as possible, when the charter
value is completely exhausted by losses on bank assets.
Even with this extreme closure assumption, higher charter
value reduces risk to the insurance fund.
The inverse relationship between assumed chartervalue
and the deposit insurance liability might seem to be at odds
with the conclusion from Chart 3, which showed that
higher assumed charter value increases financial risk. The
apparentconflictcanbe resolved by recognizing that while
higher charter values reduce measured capital ratios, the
additional value is captured by the insurer in the event ofa
bank seizure, leaving little net effect on the insurance
liability from changes in this parameter.
The moderate sensitivity ofthe deposit insurance results
to alternative assumptions about the unobservable param-
eters makes it inappropriate to attach great weight to the
specific dollar amounts ofthe liability; itis the general sec-
ular trends that are the important features for the aims of
this paper. The overall patternis clear, using any ofthe four
parametercombinations: Despite a large increase in risk to
the. deposit insurance fund during the middle ofthe sample
period, riskfrom these nine largebanks was backdownto a
relatively low level by the end ofthe decade.
It is interesting to return to the comparison ofhistorical
stock volatility and implied stock volatility, and examine
whether the difference between the two would affect the
conclusions in this section. Chart 5 compares estimates of
the total deposit insurance liability based on implied and
historical (TE' using C4 assumptions. The difference in the
fourth quarter of 1989 is huge. Using historical volatility,
the risk to the deposit insurance fund appears to be much






large secularrise in the burdenonthe insurer. By the endof
the sample period, these large banks posed little more risk
to the deposit insurance fund than at the beginning of the
period.
It is not surprising that capital increased as asset vol-
atility rose, since the regulatory guidelines in effect during
this period explicitly required banks engaged in riskier
activities to maintain highercapitalratios (Board ofGover-
nors 1985). The positive relationship is evident in Table 1,
which shows a high positive correlation between asset
volatility and capital across the sample within each period.
(If the results for individual banks were assumed to be
drawn from normal distributions for each variable, the 5
percentcritical level for anullhypothesis ofp= 0wouldbe
0.666; the correlation coefficients would be judged to be
significantly greaterthan zero, except in 1985). The rise in
marketvalue capitalratios does notreflect simply apassive
increase as bank stock prices increased along with the
overall stock market. The book value ofbank equity also
rose, both absolutely and relative to the market value of
bankassets, withmuchofthe rise duetoearnings retention
and new equity issuance. Thus, the reduction in financial
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Chart 5




higher at the end of the sample period than at the begin-
ning. However, as noted in Section IV, the difference
between historical and implied volatility in 89:IV is due
almost entirely to stock price movements on two consecu-
tive trading days, probably related to the collapse of the
UAL leveraged buyout. In this case, implied and historical
volatility lead to significantly different conclusions, and
the results based on historical clearly are questionable.
Summary
The results in this section indicate that there was no
significant overall increase in the riskiness oflarge banks
during the late 1980s. The riskiness of bank assets and
activities did increase at large banks over the five-year
period studied, butconcurrent with this increase in operat-
ingrisk, financial riskfell as marketcapitalratios rose. The
increase in marketcapital ratios was sufficient to prevent a
VI. Conclusions
This paper considers the evolution of bank risk during
the late 1980s, with.a focus on nine large U.S. banking
firms. The unusual element of this study is the use of
exchange-traded options on bank holding company stocks
to infer the volatility of bank assets and activities. The
results show that operating risk increased by about 80
percent during the period. However, with the exception of
the period around the 1987 stock market crash, financial
riskgenerallydeclined. Whenthe two separatechanges are
combined to examine overall risk to the deposit insurance
Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco 15fund, itappears that the burdenimposedby large banks on
the deposit insurer was little different at the end of the
sample period than at the beginning.
Hence, while the data do support the notion that banks
now engage in generally riskier activities than they did
previously, marketcapital ratios have on average keptpace
with the evolving mix of banking services and products,
thus preventing deterioration in the degree of protection
provided by bank capital. Large banks did not become
substantiallyriskierin whatis probablythe mostimportant
public policy sense, the risk imposed on the deposit
insurance fund. Additional regulatory actions to force
reductionsinbankrisk-takingappearneithernecessary nor
warranted, at least on the strength of changes in risk at
large banks during the late 1980s.
ENDNOTES
1. The only known previous use of these data (Levonian
1988) examined a shorter time period and used a simple
but not strictly appropriate option pricing model.
2. The model presented by Levonian is ageneralization of
Merton's and two others, Marcus (1984) and Ronn and
Verma (1986). The differences among the various models
are summarized in Levonian (1991).
3. The main motivation for assuming that charter value is
proportional to liabilities is modeling convenience; how-
ever, the assumption also is appropriate to the extent that
franchise value is related to the size of a bank's "core"
deposit base.
4. In a multiperiod setting, <1>8 would reflect the dis-
counted value of the future stream of rents as well.
5. This formulation differs slightlyfrom Levonian (1991). In
the present version, any regulatory costs are capitalized
into the value of bank assets. Note that the dividend rate
does not appear in (5) or (6). Equity is essentially a
"dividend-protected" call option, in which the option hold-
er receives the benefits of the dividend cash flow that
otherwise would reduce the value of assets and hence
equity.
6. The factor N(x - (J'Avf) is actually the probability that
the bank would remain open in a world of risk-neutral
investors, that is, a world in which the assets of the bank
earn the risk-free rate of return.
7. According to It6's Lemma, if A(t) is determined by the
stochastic process in equation (4), and equity is afunction
of A(t) and t, then the differential of E(A(t), t) is given by
aE aE a2E
dE = aA dA+ar dt+aN (dA)2,
which is essentially a Taylor series expansion of E, with all
higher-order terms vanishing as dt approaches zero (that
is, in continuous time). Substituting for dA from (4), re-
grouping terms, and recognizing that (dt)2=0, dtdz=O,
and (dz)2 = dt yields
16
dE = dt+
The term in parentheses is the expected drift of the
process. Defining ftE as the expected driftterm divided by
E(to create a percentage rate of change), the differential
dE can be written as
dE =ftEEdt+(J'EEdz,
where (J'E is given by (10). For a relatively simple discussion
of It6's Lemma and the associated stochastic calculus,
see Haley and Schall (1979), Chapter 10. For a more
rigorous but still accessible treatment, see Merton (1982).
8. This also is approximately true if the bank is very well-
capitalized, so that the probability of closure is insignifi-
cant. As a bank moves closer to the point of closure, the
contingent element becomes more important.
9. Again, if the contingent element of equity is trivial, then
N(x)=1 and N'(X-(J'AYT)=O, so that ITE=(J'A(AIE).
10. Linear regression analysis cannot rule out the possi-
bility that c and vary in some nonlinear but known '«9,y
during the sample period. Neither direct nor anecdotql
evidence suggests that changes in either parameterare a
major problem for the period studied, although King and
O'Brien (1991) argue that regulators might systematically
vary the threshold (and the monitoring interval) with the
condition of each bank. Since this possibility cannot be
ruled out, some degree of caution is appropriate in inter-
preting the results. Most previous studies using similar
contingent-claim models have implicitly held both the
closure threshold and the chartervalue ratio constantover
time and across banks, often without the critical examina-
tion given to these assumptions in this paper; Furlong
(1988) is an exception.
11. Schellhorn and Spellman (1991) calculate implicit vol-
atilities from the prices of subordinated debt issued by
bank holding companies, using the fact that risky debt
can be valued as riskless debt minus a put option on the
assets of the issuer. The spirit of the Schellhorn-Spellman
approach is very similar to the present analysis. One
drawback to their use of subordinated debt is that the
sample size is smaller, because so few banks have reg-
ularly traded subordinated debt outstanding.
12. Day and Lewis (1988) make identical assumptions
regarding interest rates and dividends.
13. Other methods for computing implied volatility typ-
ically involve weighted averages of obseNed option vol-
atilities; see Bodurtha and Courtadon (1987, pages 28-30)
Economic Review I Fall 1991for a discussion. All of the methods give heavierweight to
near-the-money options, and therefore in practice are
likely to yield results close to those obtained through the
simpler approach used here (arithmetically averaging
only the nearest-the-money options).
14. The relatively small estimated insurance liability in
Cha.rt 5 is a result ofthe assumption thatthe FDIC sells the
charters of failed banks to defray the cost of covering
deposits; only the liability net of the charter value, as
developed in equation (8), is presented.
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